Saudi Arabian petroleum plant hit with malware that tried to cause an explosion

Greg S

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Cyber attacks can cause headaches for businesses and loss of revenue. For one petrochemical operation in Saudi Arabia, a simple breach would have been preferred compared to what has been discovered. Malware found in the facility back in August was designed to damage equipment and potentially result in an explosion that would destroy the entire plant.

According to investigators looking into the matter, the only reason why the attack failed was due to a flaw in the offending code that caused a system shutdown. Had the malware been written correctly, there would be one less petroleum facility in existence. It is believed that political motives may be the reasoning for such an attack. Due to the complexity of the code, support from a government is somewhat likely.

There is fear that the same attack could be launched against other chemical processing facilities since the same industrial controllers are used across the industry. Schneider Electric has sold more than 13,000 systems that make use of Triconex safety controller susceptible to attack.

Software analysis has shown that the code used has not been discovered on any other systems to date. In order to design the malware used, it is almost essential that the developers had access to the Triconex safety system components ahead of time for testing. Investigators have stated that the parts required cost about $40,000 on eBay.

Some experts familiar with the Saudi Arabian oil and chemical industry believe that the attack may have been a way to put Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's plans to diversify the local economy on hold.

United States government entities and private security firm Mandiant are all still working on the incident. The NSA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, and also the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are all working to gather as much information as possible.

Although little information on how the attack actually works has been shared, it is believed that the malicious code can be injected remotely making the threat of another attack high.

Based on past history of attacks against Saudi Arabia and looking at the sophistication of the cyber attack leaves few likely perpetrators. The United States, Israel, Russia, China, and Iran are considered to have some of the best cyber capabilities related to industrial equipment. Out of those, only Iran has incentive to harm Saudi businesses.

Still, there is no evidence that has been shared that would be able to directly relate the attack back to a single entity. As researchers continue to gather information on the incident, it is not likely for further information to be made available.

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the only reason why the attack failed was due to a flaw in the offending code that caused a system shutdown. Had the malware been written correctly, there would be one less petroleum facility in existence

Next time.... :)
 
Russia also has incentive. An entire Saudi oil refinery going up, especially to malware, would cause oil and gas prices to skyrocket - Russia needs oil prices high, higher than they are now, in order for their fields to turn a profit.
 
I still don't get why vital systems are connected to the internet.

You are talking about people who just swapped camels for lambos.

We are talking about multi million dollars systems, there are high stakes involved, so the offending agents may have the resources (money, knowledge and time) to breach even the highest secure systems, even if it's not connected to the Internet.
 
I still don't get why vital systems are connected to the internet.

You are talking about people who just swapped camels for lambos.

We are talking about multi million dollars systems, there are high stakes involved, so the offending agents may have the resources (money, knowledge and time) to breach even the highest secure systems, even if it's not connected to the Internet.
Absolutely correct, however, the difficulty of infecting non-internet connected systems is substantially higher than those connected to the internet.
 
I still don't get why vital systems are connected to the internet.

You are talking about people who just swapped camels for lambos.

We are talking about multi million dollars systems, there are high stakes involved, so the offending agents may have the resources (money, knowledge and time) to breach even the highest secure systems, even if it's not connected to the Internet.
Absolutely correct, however, the difficulty of infecting non-internet connected systems is substantially higher than those connected to the internet.

And typically it then requires someone to be at the system in person to infect it.
 
I still don't get why vital systems are connected to the internet.

You are talking about people who just swapped camels for lambos.

We are talking about multi million dollars systems, there are high stakes involved, so the offending agents may have the resources (money, knowledge and time) to breach even the highest secure systems, even if it's not connected to the Internet.
Absolutely correct, however, the difficulty of infecting non-internet connected systems is substantially higher than those connected to the internet.

And typically it then requires someone to be at the system in person to infect it.
*cue Mission Impossible theme song*
 
Leave a USB stick with the malicious code. An employee will pick it up and plug it in to see what's on it. So much for your standalone system.
 
I still don't get why vital systems are connected to the internet.

You are talking about people who just swapped camels for lambos.

We are talking about multi million dollars systems, there are high stakes involved, so the offending agents may have the resources (money, knowledge and time) to breach even the highest secure systems, even if it's not connected to the Internet.
Absolutely correct, however, the difficulty of infecting non-internet connected systems is substantially higher than those connected to the internet.

And typically it then requires someone to be at the system in person to infect it.
If you worked there perhaps you'd take notes about how they update the systems.. infect a patch. wont have to be there physically.
 
Leave a USB stick with the malicious code. An employee will pick it up and plug it in to see what's on it. So much for your standalone system.

Chances are that wouldn't occur though. Most companies have been warned about that sort of attack and to think they'd rush over to the main offline systems to do it instead of their own personal connected to net system seems unlikely as well.

With the left USB attack, why even have a malicious code, just build a usb system killer stick. Actual mission critical systems should have thier usb's disabled and tower locked up.
 
And typically it then requires someone to be at the system in person to infect it.

Let's suppose you work at a chemical plant as a security officer... How high can your salary be?
Now how much an external attacker would pay you for you simply to plug a usb stick? Or to just drop this usb stick in the floor?

The system maybe installed at Mount Doom and covered with lava, if there's people around it, it's not 100% secure.
 
Let's suppose you work at a chemical plant as a security officer... How high can your salary be?
Now how much an external attacker would pay you for you simply to plug a usb stick? Or to just drop this usb stick in the floor?

The system maybe installed at Mount Doom and covered with lava, if there's people around it, it's not 100% secure.
When did I say it's a 100% secure? lol
 
They have done tests, the USB stick doesn't need to be in the building even, the parking lot will do. Many people walk past it, but overwhelmingly someone picks it up and plugs it in. Education only seems to go so far.
 
They could use special box that can be interconnected that the big agencies like NSA,FBI,CSIS. It is encrypted and they could make sure everything that connect to the network have a signatures and get locked out of the system unless it is pre-approved etc.. That could make a big difference. Only work with white list everything that is authorized and nothing else. The problem is that it is too opened.
 
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