Dozens of police officers accused of using license plate cameras to track women

Skye Jacobs

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TL;DR: An investigation has revealed a growing number of police officers using license-plate reader systems to track women they knew personally, turning a tool sold for crime fighting into one that could also enable stalking and surveillance. The problem is not limited to one department or one state. It is showing up wherever these systems are widely deployed and lightly checked.

The main tool being misused is Flock Safety, a network of roadside cameras that scan and catalog billions of license plates each month. The firm says its network spans more than 6,000 communities, with devices designed to capture plates in difficult conditions, including at night and in heavy rain, using computer vision. The result is a searchable, time-stamped record of vehicle locations that officers can query without a warrant.

The technical capabilities are straightforward but powerful. Cameras feed plate data into a centralized system, where officers can search by plate number or, using newer "vehicle fingerprint" tools, by characteristics such as color or bumper stickers.

Alerts can be set through "hot lists," notifying users when a vehicle appears anywhere in the network. The infrastructure is distributed – solar-powered cameras connected via cellular networks – making it easy to deploy across cities, suburbs and private properties.

That accessibility, combined with minimal friction in running searches, has created what investigators describe as a gap between capability and oversight. According to the Washington Post's review of police and court records, at least 50 officers nationwide have been accused of or charged with misusing license-plate reader systems, often to track women in their personal lives. In 46 of those cases, Flock's system was involved.

In one case in Georgia, a police chief used the system to repeatedly search for a woman's vehicle, logging hundreds of queries over more than a year. After confronting him, she learned he had relied on the camera network to monitor her movements. "It's a camera system that reads tags," he wrote in a message. He later added, "Don't worry I'm not tracking you or some weird stalker s--t."

Audit logs – one of the system's built-in accountability features – ultimately revealed the extent of the searches. Those logs have become a central mechanism for detecting misuse, but they are typically reviewed only after complaints or internal investigations. Some departments make them available through public records requests, while others do not, limiting visibility into how often the tools are used or abused.

Flock has emphasized that misuse represents a small fraction of overall activity and points to logging and auditing as safeguards. "We're not going to change humans, and humans make bad decisions," CEO Garrett Langley told the Washington Post. "What we can do is make sure that they know if you use this tool, you will be held accountable."

The company recently introduced a voluntary feature that scans for suspicious query patterns, such as repeated searches for the same vehicle or activity outside an officer's working hours.

However, critics argue that optional safeguards and decentralized policy decisions leave too much room for abuse. Police agencies set their own rules for access and use, and in many jurisdictions there is no requirement to tie a search to a case number or active investigation. With no comprehensive federal framework governing license-plate reader use, standards vary widely across the roughly 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the country.

Privacy advocates say the underlying issue is not just misconduct but the design of the system itself. The ability to reconstruct a person's movements – where they shop, seek medical care or spend time – creates a detailed behavioral profile that can be accessed with little immediate oversight. "Flock has already claimed that they have oversight, that they have guardrails, and we still see these kinds of abuses," said Eva Galperin of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Law enforcement officials and consultants counter that tighter restrictions could undermine a tool they view as transformative. Langley has described license-plate readers as critical infrastructure for modern policing, citing their role in criminal investigations and recoveries. In a public talk, he recalled a police chief describing the technology as "as transformational as DNA."

The tension reflects a broader shift in policing technology, where systems built for scale – large datasets, cross-agency sharing, AI-assisted search – are outpacing governance models designed for smaller, more localized tools. In several documented cases, officers continued to access license-plate databases even after concerns were raised internally.

Flock is facing growing pushback from communities concerned about privacy and other issues. In Roseville, California, an internal police review found more than 1,000 false positives from the system over two years.

Nevertheless, many city officials remain enthusiastic about the network, even as privacy concerns continue to grow. For people who learn they've been tracked, often only after the fact, the experience shows just how hidden these systems can be. Cameras mounted on utility poles or roadside fixtures continuously collect data, while access remains largely confined to law enforcement systems. As one victim put it after learning how often her vehicle had been queried, "He watched every single move I made."

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They'll track their partner to make sure they're not cheating on them, they'll track potential love interests, they'll track relatives if they think they're trying to exclude them from something etc etc. Ever since any form of tracking could be used through a computer rather than a person this has been the case over and over.
Perhaps they shouldn't need a warrant, but they should need some form of permission after providing a 'why' that's granted either by an automated system that gets a person to look into it if the requests are frequent, or through a person they're otherwise unfamiliar with in the first place.
 
IMO, all jurisdictions must implement a permission based system where a user of this tag reader database must input a specific case number to be able to access any information from this database, and make it a requirement that the user themselves be on an "authorized list" which indicates that the user is authorized to work on the case that they input, and finally, make it a requirement that the tag belongs to a suspect or person of interest for the case; otherwise, no access is granted if these conditions are not met.

Finally, as part of an audit trail, any access to the database for a specific case must be sent to the supervisor assigned as the lead officer on the case, and they must review all the data associated with the request.

IMO, something like this is the only way that unauthorized access to this database will be prevented. No one, IMO, should have willy-nilly access to this database. There are enough abusive law enforcement officers as it is; we don't need yet another avenue for bad actors that enables abusive actions.

 
What I find incredible about this article is it talks about "little immediate oversight" and "minimal friction" but then it proceeds to not describe the most compelling oversight or friction Flock Safety offers. For one, data is automatically deleted (after 30 days by default).

Second, data is not automatically shared with law enforcement. When there are cameras at shopping centers or hospitals for example, it's the local business who is the one to purchase/install it (not police). They have control of their own cameras, as well as what law enforcement agencies they wish to share images and metadata with. Generally license plate reader cameras that law enforcement has access to are simply placed in high traffic roadways and do not give police a specific location that the driver is going to.

The article does mention a required case number used by some departments, but it does not mention that a search reason is ALWAYS required. Should laws be passed to regulate this technology? Definitely. But is Flock Safety enabling mass surveillance? The people saying yes are overestimating Flock's ability to do that at its current stage. Almost every camera installed is at the same location as one or more cameras, so the total number of locations monitored is (at most) half of the number of flock cameras. I found that out of a paved road network size of 2,674,826 miles in the US, there is one Flock camera every 21 miles of roadway (or more accurately 1 monitored direction every 43 miles when considering roadways are two-way but cameras face one direction).

Finally, a growing number of police departments are using the transparency portal feature. Last year it was 562 agencies, and a year later that number has increased 70% to 950 agencies. From transparency reports, only 20/562 agencies (4%) maintain data for longer than 30 days.
 
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