GrapheneOS is a privacy and security focused mobile OS with Android app compatibility developed as a non-profit open source project. It's focused on the research and development of privacy and security technology including substantial improvements to sandboxing, exploit mitigations and the permission model. It was founded in 2014 and was formerly known as CopperheadOS.

GrapheneOS improves the privacy and security of the OS from the bottom up. It deploys technologies to mitigate whole classes of vulnerabilities and make exploiting the most common sources of vulnerabilities substantially more difficult. It improves the security of both the OS and the apps running on it. The app sandbox and other security boundaries are fortified. GrapheneOS tries to avoid impacting the user experience with the privacy and security features. Ideally, the features can be designed so that they're always enabled with no impact on the user experience and no additional complexity like configuration options. It's not always feasible, and GrapheneOS does add various toggles for features like the Network permission, Sensors permission, restrictions when the device is locked (USB-C and pogo pins, camera, quick tiles), etc. along with more complex user-facing privacy and security features with their own UX.

Full list of features can be found here.

No Google apps or services

GrapheneOS will never include either Google Play services or another implementation of Google services like microG. It's possible to install Play services as a set of fully sandboxed apps without special privileges via our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer.

These are the features of GrapheneOS beyond what's provided by version 16 of the Android Open Source Project. It only covers our improvements to AOSP and not baseline features. This section doesn't list features like the standard app sandbox, verified boot, exploit mitigations (ASLR, SSP, Shadow Call Stack, Control Flow Integrity, etc.), permission system (foreground-only and one-time permission grants, scoped file access control, etc.) and so on but rather only our improvements to modern Android. We plan on providing a separate page listing the improvements we've contributed to Android since those features aren't listed here despite being a substantial portion of our overall historical work.

Defending against exploitation of unknown vulnerabilities

GrapheneOS is heavily focused on protecting users against attackers exploiting unknown (0 day) vulnerabilities. Patching vulnerabilities doesn't protect users before the vulnerability is known to the vendor and has a patch developed and shipped.

Unknown (0 day) vulnerabilities are much more widely used than most realize to exploit users not just in targeted attacks but in broad deployments. Project Zero maintains a spreadsheet tracking zero day exploitation detected in the wild. This is only a peek into what's happening since it only documents cases where the attackers were caught exploiting users, often because the attacks are not targeted but rather deployed on public websites, etc.

More complete patching

GrapheneOS includes fixes for a large number of vulnerabilities not yet fixed in Android.

We're able to quickly and safely ship the latest Linux kernel LTS point releases on devices with GKI (Generic Kernel Image) support including the 6th and 7th generation Pixel phones. At the time of writing on 2023-11-06, GrapheneOS is using the latest Linux 5.10 GKI LTS release (5.10.199) for 6th and 7th generation Pixel phones. The stock Pixel OS is on Linux 5.10.157 from 2022-12-02 with a small number of additional patches backported. This means GrapheneOS provides hundreds of relevant kernel patches including many security patches not yet included in the stock OS. It's possible for us to stay several months ahead due to their approach of moving to new LTS releases only in quarterly releases after a long freeze and testing process.

Android Auto

GrapheneOS provides an option to install and use the official releases of Android Auto.

Android Auto requires privileged access in order to work. GrapheneOS uses an extension of the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer to make Android Auto work with a reduced level of privileges.

Web installer

This is the WebUSB-based installer for GrapheneOS and is the recommended approach for most users. The command-line installation guide is the more traditional approach to installing GrapheneOS.

If you have trouble with the installation process, ask for help on the official GrapheneOS chat channel. There are almost always people around willing to help with it. Before asking for help, make an attempt to follow the guide on your own and then ask for help with anything you get stuck on.

Prerequisites

You need a computer for running the web installer with at least 2GB of free memory available and 32GB of free storage space. The web installer can be run on an Android phone or tablet, unlike the command-line installation.

You need a USB cable for attaching the device to the computer performing the installation. Whenever possible, use the high quality standards compliant USB-C cable packaged with the device. If your computer doesn't have any USB-C ports, you'll need a high quality USB-C to USB-A cable. You should avoid using a USB hub such as the front panel on a desktop computer case. Connect directly to a rear port on a desktop or the ports on a laptop. Many widely distributed USB cables and hubs are broken and are the most common source of issues for installing GrapheneOS.

Installing from an OS in a virtual machine is not recommended. USB passthrough is often not reliable. To rule out these problems, install from an OS running on bare metal. Virtual machines are also often configured to have overly limited memory and storage space.

Officially supported operating systems for the web install method:

  • Windows 10
  • Windows 11
  • macOS Sonoma (14)
  • macOS Sequoia (15)
  • macOS Tahoe (26)
  • Arch Linux
  • Debian 12 (bookworm)
  • Debian 13 (trixie)
  • Ubuntu 22.04 LTS
  • Ubuntu 24.04 LTS
  • Ubuntu 25.04
  • Linux Mint 21 (follow Ubuntu 22.04 LTS instructions)
  • Linux Mint 22 (follow Ubuntu 24.04 LTS instructions)
  • Linux Mint Debian Edition 6 (follow Debian 12 instructions)
  • ChromeOS
  • GrapheneOS
  • Android 14 with Play Protect certification
  • Android 15 with Play Protect certification
  • Android 16 with Play Protect certification
  • Android 17 with Play Protect certification

Older end-of-life versions of these platforms can also be used but are not officially supported. Make sure your operating system is up-to-date before proceeding.

Officially supported browsers for the web install method:

  • Chromium (outside Ubuntu, since they ship a broken Snap package without working WebUSB)
  • Vanadium (GrapheneOS)
  • Google Chrome
  • Microsoft Edge
  • Brave (with Brave Shields disabled, since it caps storage usage at a low value to avoid fingerprinting available storage)

On Android, disable desktop mode for the browser since it currently prevents our web installer from detecting Android and handling needing to request permission to reconnect to the device after each reboot. Desktop mode is enabled by default on large tablets with at least 8GB of RAM such as the Pixel Tablet.

You should avoid Flatpak and Snap versions of browsers, as they're known to cause issues during the installation process. Make sure your browser is up-to-date before proceeding.

Do not use Incognito or other private browsing modes. These modes usually prevent the web installer from having enough storage space to extract the downloaded release.

You need one of the officially supported devices. To make sure that the device can be unlocked to install GrapheneOS, avoid carrier variants of the devices. Carrier variants of Pixels use the same stock OS and firmware with a non-zero carrier id flashed onto the persist partition in the factory. The carrier id activates carrier-specific configuration in the stock OS including disabling carrier and bootloader unlocking. The carrier may be able to remotely disable this, but their support staff may not be aware and they probably won't do it. Get a carrier agnostic device to avoid the risk and potential hassle. If you CAN figure out a way to unlock a carrier device, it isn't a problem as GrapheneOS can just ignore the carrier id and the hardware is the same.

It's best practice to update the device before installing GrapheneOS to have the latest firmware for connecting the device to the computer and performing the early flashing process. Either way, GrapheneOS flashes the latest firmware early in the installation process.

Enabling OEM unlocking

OEM unlocking needs to be enabled from within the operating system. Enable the developer options menu by going to Settings > About phone/tablet and repeatedly pressing the Build number menu entry until developer mode is enabled.

Next, go to Settings > System > Developer options and toggle on the OEM unlocking setting. On device model variants (SKUs) which support being sold as locked devices by carriers, enabling OEM unlocking requires internet access so that the stock OS can check if the device was sold as locked by a carrier.

For the Pixel 6a, OEM unlocking won't work with the version of the stock OS from the factory. You need to update it to the June 2022 release or later via an over-the-air update. After you've updated it you'll also need to factory reset the device to fix OEM unlocking.

Flashing as non-root

On traditional Linux distributions, USB devices cannot be used as non-root without udev rules for each type of device. This is not an issue for other platforms.

On Arch Linux, install the android-udev package. On Debian and Ubuntu, install the android-sdk-platform-tools-common package.

Working around fwupd bugs on Linux distributions

The fwupd software often used on Linux distributions for updating firmware is known to incorrectly connect to arbitrary devices using the fastboot protocol which will block using them for the intended purpose. This can result in receiving an error about the USB device already being in use (claimed) when trying to connect to it for the intended purpose.

You can stop fwupd with the following command:

  • sudo systemctl stop fwupd.service

This doesn't disable the service and it will start again on reboot.

Booting into the bootloader interface

You need to boot your device into the bootloader interface. To do this, you need to hold the volume down button while the device boots. The easiest approach is to reboot the device and begin holding the volume down button until it boots up into the bootloader interface.

Alternatively, turn off the device, then boot it up while holding the volume down button during the boot process. You can either boot it with the power button or by plugging it in as required in the next section.

This step is not complete until your device displays a red warning triangle and the words "Fastboot Mode". You must not press the device's power button to activate the "Start" menu item, because the device must remain paused in Fastboot mode for the installer to connect to it.

Connecting the device

Connect the device to the computer. On Linux, you'll need to do this again if you didn't have the udev rules set up when you connected it.

Current Windows 10 and Windows 11 include a generic driver usable for fastboot and no longer require installing a driver for installation on the Pixel 4a (5G) or later. It isn't enough for legacy 4th generation Pixels due to the driver not handling fastbootd, so you still need the driver for those. Outdated Windows versions will still need the driver for non-obsolete devices too. You can obtain the driver from Windows Update which will detect it as an optional update when the device is booted into the bootloader interface and connected to the computer. Open Windows Update, run a check for updates and then open the "View optional updates" interface. Install the driver for the Android bootloader interface as an optional update, which will show up as "LeMobile Android Device" due to USB ID overlap. An alternative approach to obtaining the Windows fastboot driver is to obtain the latest driver for Pixels from Google and then manually install it with the Windows Device Manager.

For the Pixel Tablet, disconnect it from the stand before continuing. The stand uses USB to provide charging and audio output, but the tablet lacks support for using both the stand and USB port at the same time.

Post-installation

Booting

You've now successfully installed GrapheneOS and can boot it. Pressing the power button with the default Start option selected in the bootloader interface will boot the OS.

Disabling OEM unlocking

During first setup, the final screen will contain a toggle regarding OEM unlocking which is checked by default. This will disable OEM unlocking, which is recommended.

If you need to enable or disable OEM unlocking in the future, it can be done in the developer settings menu within the operating system.

Verifying installation

The verified boot and attestation features provided by the supported devices can be used to verify that the hardware, firmware and GrapheneOS installation are genuine. Even if the computer you used to flash GrapheneOS was compromised and an attacker replaced GrapheneOS with their own malicious OS, it can be detected with these features.

Verified boot verifies the entirety of the firmware and OS images on every boot. The public key for the firmware images is burned into fuses in the SoC at the factory. Firmware security updates also update the rollback index burned into fuses to provide rollback protection.

The final firmware boot stage before the OS is responsible for verifying it. For the stock OS, it uses a hard-wired public key. Installing GrapheneOS flashes the GrapheneOS verified boot public key to the secure element. Each boot, this key is loaded and used to verify the OS. For both the stock OS and GrapheneOS, a rollback index based on the security patch level is loaded from the secure element to provide rollback protection.

Verified boot key hash

When loading an alternate OS, the device shows a yellow notice on boot with the ID of the alternate OS based on the sha256 of the verified boot public key. 4th and 5th generation Pixels only show the first 32 bits of the hash so you can't use this approach. 6th generation Pixels onwards show the full hash and you can compare it against the official GrapheneOS verified boot key hashes below:

  • Pixel 10a: d8f879d10419eddc9fcda6280718be763f6bf12299e1f72df3ea8ad8a8eb7f80
  • Pixel 10 Pro Fold: 55a2d44103e56d5ec65496399c417987ba77730e6488fc60ba058d09fc3caee3
  • Pixel 10 Pro XL: 141d7fc32af7958a416f2661b37cf6f27bfb376fb5ce616aeaa27a82c7a04f74
  • Pixel 10 Pro: 4e8ee8f717754052198ca6d2d3aaa232e2461b4293c0d6f297e519cc778de093
  • Pixel 10: 3f7415ea26f5df5b14ea6d153256071a7a1af9ce7b0970b7311cc463c7ea02c7
  • Pixel 9a: 0508de44ee00bfb49ece32c418af1896391abde0f05b64f41bc9a2dfb589445b
  • Pixel 9 Pro Fold: af4d2c6e62be0fec54f0271b9776ff061dd8392d9f51cf6ab1551d346679e24c
  • Pixel 9 Pro XL: 55d3c2323db91bb91f20d38d015e85112d038f6b6b5738fe352c1a80dba57023
  • Pixel 9 Pro: f729cab861da1b83fdfab402fc9480758f2ae78ee0b61c1f2137dd1ab7076e86
  • Pixel 9: 9e6a8f3e0d761a780179f93acd5721ba1ab7c8c537c7761073c0a754b0e932de
  • Pixel 8a: 096b8bd6d44527a24ac1564b308839f67e78202185cbff9cfdcb10e63250bc5e
  • Pixel 8 Pro: 896db2d09d84e1d6bb747002b8a114950b946e5825772a9d48ba7eb01d118c1c
  • Pixel 8: cd7479653aa88208f9f03034810ef9b7b0af8a9d41e2000e458ac403a2acb233
  • Pixel Fold: ee0c9dfef6f55a878538b0dbf7e78e3bc3f1a13c8c44839b095fe26dd5fe2842
  • Pixel Tablet: 94df136e6c6aa08dc26580af46f36419b5f9baf46039db076f5295b91aaff230
  • Pixel 7a: 508d75dea10c5cbc3e7632260fc0b59f6055a8a49dd84e693b6d8899edbb01e4
  • Pixel 7 Pro: bc1c0dd95664604382bb888412026422742eb333071ea0b2d19036217d49182f
  • Pixel 7: 3efe5392be3ac38afb894d13de639e521675e62571a8a9b3ef9fc8c44fd17fa1
  • Pixel 6a: 08c860350a9600692d10c8512f7b8e80707757468e8fbfeea2a870c0a83d6031
  • Pixel 6 Pro: 439b76524d94c40652ce1bf0d8243773c634d2f99ba3160d8d02aa5e29ff925c
  • Pixel 6: f0a890375d1405e62ebfd87e8d3f475f948ef031bbf9ddd516d5f600a23677e8

Checking this is useful after installation, but you don't need to check it manually for verified boot to work. The verified boot public key flashed to the secure element can only be changed when the device is unlocked. Unlocking the device performs the same wiping of the secure element as a factory reset and prevents data from being recovered even if the SSD was cloned and your passphrase(s) are obtained because the encryption keys can no longer be derived anymore. The verified boot key is also one of the inputs for deriving the encryption keys in addition to the user's lock method(s) and random token(s) on the secure element.

What's New

  • Secure (exec) spawning: skip vkey.android.vos.VosZygotePreload to make exec-based spawning compatible with apps using V-KEY V-OS Mobile App Protection
  • Secure (exec) spawning: skip redundant mount namespace setup for compatibility with anti-tampering code checking Linux mount IDs
  • start compat zygote at boot instead of on-demand for compatibility with anti-tampering code checking Linux mount IDs (compat zygote is only used when both secure spawning and hardened_malloc are disabled for an app)
  • use lazy preloading for compat zygote to reduce memory usage when it's not used (it's only used for app processes which disable both hardened_malloc and secure spawning)
  • install CarrierConfig2 in all profiles to avoid using default carrier configuration values in secondary users
  • notify when Wi-Fi hotspot is disabled due to user change (since users have separate Wi-Fi settings since Android 17) to provide a shortcut for turning it back on via the notification
  • remove our change raising the zygote's maximum file limit to 256Ki since this has been implemented upstream as a 512Ki limit with correct handling for 32-bit processes
  • kernel (Pixel 10, Pixel 10 Pro, Pixel 10 Pro XL, Pixel 10 Pro Fold): integrate minor upstream synopsys driver change unrelated to security
  • kernel (6.6): update to latest GKI LTS branch revision including update to 6.6.141
  • Vanadium: update to version 150.0.7871.124.0
  • add secure spawning file descriptor regression test

All of the Android 17 security patches from the current July 2026, August 2026, September 2026, October 2026, November 2026, December 2026 and January 2027 Android Security Bulletins are included in the 2026071501 security preview release. List of additional fixed CVEs:

  • Critical: CVE-2026-28591, CVE-2026-28604, CVE-2026-28639, CVE-2026-28662, CVE-2026-28666, CVE-2026-45515, CVE-2026-45531, CVE-2026-49879, CVE-2026-49882, CVE-2026-49884, CVE-2026-49918, CVE-2026-49921, CVE-2026-49926, CVE-2026-49927, CVE-2026-49932, CVE-2026-49933, CVE-2026-55256, CVE-2026-55268, CVE-2026-55269, CVE-2026-55273, CVE-2026-55277, CVE-2026-55280, CVE-2026-58823, CVE-2026-58835, CVE-2026-58865
  • High: CVE-2025-22442, CVE-2025-48564, CVE-2025-48565, CVE-2025-48566, CVE-2026-0053, CVE-2026-28581, CVE-2026-28582, CVE-2026-28584, CVE-2026-28588, CVE-2026-28593, CVE-2026-28594, CVE-2026-28599, CVE-2026-28600, CVE-2026-28602, CVE-2026-28603, CVE-2026-28606, CVE-2026-28607, CVE-2026-28612, CVE-2026-28613, CVE-2026-28614, CVE-2026-28617, CVE-2026-28619, CVE-2026-28620, CVE-2026-28622, CVE-2026-28623, CVE-2026-28624, CVE-2026-28626, CVE-2026-28627, CVE-2026-28630, CVE-2026-28631, CVE-2026-28633, CVE-2026-28634, CVE-2026-28635, CVE-2026-28638, CVE-2026-28643, CVE-2026-28650, CVE-2026-28652, CVE-2026-28655, CVE-2026-28657, CVE-2026-28658, CVE-2026-28660, CVE-2026-28663, CVE-2026-28664, CVE-2026-28665, CVE-2026-28667, CVE-2026-28668, CVE-2026-28671, CVE-2026-45513, CVE-2026-45514, CVE-2026-45517, CVE-2026-45518, CVE-2026-45519, CVE-2026-45520, CVE-2026-45521, CVE-2026-45523, CVE-2026-45524, CVE-2026-45525, CVE-2026-45527, CVE-2026-45528, CVE-2026-45529, CVE-2026-49878, CVE-2026-49880, CVE-2026-49881, CVE-2026-49885, CVE-2026-49887, CVE-2026-49895, CVE-2026-49896, CVE-2026-49912, CVE-2026-49913, CVE-2026-49914, CVE-2026-49923, CVE-2026-49924, CVE-2026-49925, CVE-2026-49931, CVE-2026-49934, CVE-2026-49935, CVE-2026-49937, CVE-2026-55257, CVE-2026-55261, CVE-2026-55262, CVE-2026-55263, CVE-2026-55264, CVE-2026-55266, CVE-2026-55270, CVE-2026-55271, CVE-2026-55272, CVE-2026-55278, CVE-2026-55279, CVE-2026-55282, CVE-2026-55286, CVE-2026-55287, CVE-2026-55288, CVE-2026-55289, CVE-2026-55290, CVE-2026-55292, CVE-2026-55294, CVE-2026-58815, CVE-2026-58817, CVE-2026-58821, CVE-2026-58822, CVE-2026-58834, CVE-2026-58836, CVE-2026-58837, CVE-2026-58838, CVE-2026-58841, CVE-2026-58853, CVE-2026-58854, CVE-2026-58856, CVE-2026-58857, CVE-2026-58859, CVE-2026-58860, CVE-2026-58868, CVE-2026-58869
  • Unclassified: CVE-2026-28653, CVE-2026-55260, CVE-2026-58820